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Lake City, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Grant presiding. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION 
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A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the 
proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the 
use of threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force 
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force 
a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not 
have resisted. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THK STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
NINA MINCORELLI 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF .OF RESPOND LINT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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C r i m i n a l Misch ie f , a c l a s s B misdemeanor oil Apr i l 16, 1990 
Bel ore t i i u i l , LILL LiiddiiL Laiood a motion in l i m i n e l o p r e s e n t 
e v i d e n c e toward t h e d e f e n s e of n e c e s s i t y , The mot ion was d e n i e d 
by t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defense of necessity does, not ii|'|il|> In Ms Minrun»lli. 
Even i I jl ''id, 1,1'ie evidence Ms. Mincorelli pi ottered did not qo 
toward pro vl ng the elements of the defense. Instead, Mr , Ii! ox, 
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Case NOo 900265-CA 
Pr ior i I: y # ' 
Ms. Mincorelli's expert witness, would have testified about the 
perils of homelessness generally. Since Ms. Mincorelli did not 
present evidence sufficient to prove the defense and it does not 
apply to her conduct, she was not improperly denied the 
opportunity to present it. 
ARGUMENT 
THE NECESSITY DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY TO MS. MINCORELLI: 
THEREFORE, SHE WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN SHE WAS NOT 
PERMITTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE. 
The necessity defense is available in Utah. State v. 
Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1986), Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-2-
302(1) (1973). To assert the defense, the defendant must show 
that s 
le the act charged must have been done to prevent a significant 
evil; 
2. there must have been no adequate alternative; and 
3. the harm caused must have not been disproportionate to the 
harm avoided. 
Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1078 
(Alaska 1981). As appellant states in her brief, the first two 
elements require a subjective assessment of the defendant's 
belief. However, in addition to the subjective assessment, fl[a]n 
objective determination must be made as to whether the 
defendant's value judgment was correct, given the facts as he 
reasonably perceived them." Id. (emphasis added). The third 
element requires only an objective assessment. 
Furthermore, the defense of necessity is unavailable if: 
1. there is a third alternative available to the defendants 
2 
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First, Ms. Mincorelli had plenty of adequate alternatives 
other than criminal mischief to attempt to remedy her 
homelessness or homelessness generally. "In a free society, 
neither the political process nor the avenue of lawful protest is 
an exhaustible remedy for an unwise policy decision . . . Illegal 
conduct designed to influence policies cannot be considered 
s
necessary' where such lawful avenues are available." In re 
Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. 
App. 1 Dist. 1985) (emphasis added). The Marley court observed 
that "[o]ther forms of non-criminal protest were and are 
available to defendants to enable them to dramatize, and hence 
hopefully terminate, conduct which they view as harmful." 
Marley, 509 P.2d at 1109 (trespass defendants protested the 
Vietnam War). Some reasonable alternatives available to Ms. 
Mincorelli included lobbying the legislature, lawful leafletting, 
attracting press attention and peaceful protesting. Even if Ms. 
Mincorelli subjectively believed she had no alternative to 
painting the capitol floor, the objective prong of the test 
dictates that no reasonable person would come to that conclusion. 
Therefore, Ms. Mincorelli!s claim that no adequate alternatives 
were available is invalid. 
Ms. Mincorelli faced no imminent harm. Nothing was 
threatening Ms. Mincorelli at the time she painted the capitol. 
The necessity defense developed to aid defendants in emergency 
situations. Ms. Mincorelli was not facing an emergency. Like 
the defendant in Marley, the potential harm was, "at best, only 
4 
tenuously connected with the situs of the crime, and would be 
only tenuously affected by defendants' acts . . . We cannot find 
any real 'necessity'" to act. Marley, 509 P.2d at 1109. The 
evidence proffered by Ms. Mincorelli in this case would not have 
gone toward proving the existence of an emergency. 
Ms. Mincorelli's actions were not reasonably calculated to 
prevent the harm of homelessness. There must be a "direct causal 
relationship .
 c • reasonably anticipated to exist between the 
defend[ant]'s action and the avoidance of harm." Marley, 509 
P.2d at 1109. Under any possible set of hypotheticals, Ms. 
Mincorelli could see that painting the floor would not end her or 
others' condition of homelessness or protect them from the 
dangers of the street. 
Ms. Mincorelli argues that the necessity defense is proper 
because the harm caused by her criminal mischief (approximately 
twenty five dollars) was less than the perceived harm she sought 
to prevent. The necessity defense does not protect criminal harm 
that is less than the harm avoided. The requirement is that the 
harm caused not be disproportionate to the harm avoided. Public 
policy demands that the necessity defense not be extended to 
protect the criminal destruction of public property simply 
because the actual damage did not amount to a significant sum. 
The "significant evil" that appellant claims to have been 
preventing is the evil of her and others' conditions of 
homelessness. This is not the type of "significant evil" the 
necessity defense protects. If it were, crimes could be 
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justifiably committed to "prevent" poverty, alcoholism, 
illiteracy or disease, etc. Even if Ms. Mincorelli subjectively 
believed her or others1 homelessness was a legitimate 
"significant evil," the objective prong of the test would 
preclude this element. No reasonable person would conclude that 
homelessness was a "significant evil" in the necessity defense 
context. 
The testimony of Jeff Fox would not have proved the defense 
of necessity. Mr« Fox would have testified to the problems and 
dangers facing the homeless generally. He would not have 
testified that Ms« Mincorelli had to either paint the floor of 
the capitol or face imminent peril. The trial court did not err 
when it refused to allow Ms. Mincorelli to present Jeff Fox as a 
witness• 
Ms. Mincorellifs goal appears to have been to gain Governor 
Bangerterfs attention, not to avoid an emergency situation,, This 
is not the type of situation that the necessity defense is 
intended to aide There is not a sufficient causal relationship 
between the perceived harm and the crime of criminal mischief. 
Recently, a District of Columbia court rejected the same 
issue appealed by appellant in the present case. In Reale v. 
United States, 573 A.2d 13, 14-15 (D.C. App. 1990), defendants 
were convicted of disorderly conduct within the United States 
Capitol. Defendants went into the gallery of the House of 
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Representatives and began shouting about bombs and homelessness. 
On appeal, the defendants argued they were improperly denied the 
opportunity to assert the necessity defense. The court affirmed, 
reasoning that 
[t]he [necessity] defense does not apply where there is a 
legal alternative available to the defendant, or where the 
defendant's actions could not have directly prevented the 
anticipated harm . . . Here, appellants could have made 
their views known to Congress in many ways which did not 
violate the law. Furthermore, their protest could not have 
had any immediate impact on the crisis of homelessness. 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
In In re Weller, 164 Cal. App. 3d 44, 49, 210 Cal. Rptr. 
130, 133 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1985), the defendants' contended that 
their proffer of evidence met all the elements of the necessity 
defense and that the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
failing to permit them to present the defense. The Court of 
Appeals denied their contentions and noted: 
We do not mean to ignore or trivialize this country's 
history of civil disobedience (e.g., the Boston Tea Party, 
the Underground Railroad, Freedom Marches in the South, and 
some of the Vietnam War protests). From the perspective of 
history many unlawful acts may be seen as justified or even 
"necessary." Some have been rendered lawful by finding 
constitutional defects in the prohibitory enactments. But 
the determination that these actions were "necessary" can 
only be made from a distance, and then not with legal 
precision. Unless the laws are held unconstitutional, those 
challenging or defying them must be prepared to bear the 
short-term consequences of their actions in the hope that 
society will benefit and that historians will look 
charitably upon them. 
In re Weller, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (emphasis added). 
Since no reasonable person could find the defense of 
necessity to apply to appellant's actions, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion in limine. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defense of necessity does not apply to Ms. Mincorelli. 
Even if it did, the evidence Ms. Mincorelli proffered did not go 
toward proving the elements of the defense. Since she did not 
make the proper showing, the trial court correctly declined to 
instruct the jury on the necessity defense. The state 
respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to affirm Ms. 
Mincorelli's conviction. 
DATED this jj day of 1990, 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
riRjSINIA CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
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